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Abstract— Modern distributed applications are embedding an increasing degree of dynamism, from dynamic supply-chain 
management, enterprise federations, and virtual collaborations to dynamic resource acquisitions and service interactions across 
organizations. Such dynamism leads to new challenges in security and dependability. Collaborating services in a system with a 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) may belong to different security realms but often need to be engaged dynamically at 
runtime. If their security realms do not have a direct cross-realm authentication relationship, it is technically difficult to enable 
any secure collaboration between the services. A potential solution to this would be to locate intermediate realms at runtime, 
which serve as an authentication-path between the two separate realms. However, the process of generating an authentication 
path for two distributed services can be highly complicated. It could involve a large number of extra operations for credential 
conversion and require a long chain of invocations to intermediate services. In this paper, we address this problem by designing 
and implementing a new cross-realm authentication protocol for dynamic service interactions, based on the notion of service-
oriented multi-party business sessions. Our protocol requires neither credential conversion nor establishment of any 
authentication path between the participating services in a business session. The correctness of the protocol is formally 
analyzed and proven, and an empirical study is performed using two production quality Grid systems, Globus 4 and CROWN. 
The experimental results indicate that the proposed protocol and its implementation have a sound level of scalability and impose 
only a limited degree of performance overhead, which is for example comparable with those security-related overheads in 
Globus 4. 
Index Terms— Authentication, inter-organizational security, multi-party interactions, Service-Oriented Architecture, Web 
services 
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1 INTRODUCTION
ith the emergence of service-oriented technologies, 
dynamism and flexibility are becoming the core char-
acteristics of modern inter-organizational business process-
es, such as business application integration, distributed auc-
tion services, and order processing [1, 2]. Within a service-
oriented architecture (SOA), an organization may encapsu-
late and publish its applications as services, and select and 
interact at runtime with the services provided by other or-
ganizations. However, such dynamic interactions at runtime 
raise immediate problems of security, trust and dependabil-
ity [3]. Until these problems are addressed and solved satis-
factorily, the potential of automatic inter-organizational 
business processes will be severely restricted.  
In a dynamic and distributed environment, it is often dif-
ficult for a complex business process to follow a static busi-
ness specification. The execution order of its activities at 
runtime is usually unpredictable, and on some occasions, the 
actual execution of a process can be “one-of-a-kind” [4]. 
The applications and services involved in a complex busi-
ness process are typically heterogeneous, provided by dif-
ferent organizations. Since each organization has its own 
security mechanisms and policies to protect its local re-
sources, the business process has to operate amongst multi-
ple, heterogeneous security realms. A security realm is a 
group of principals (e.g. people, computers, services) that 
are registered with an authentication authority and managed 
through a consistent set of security processes and policies 
for resource sharing. An authentication authority is a trusted 
principal that performs reliable authentication functions [5]. 
Authentication is a critical measure for any security realm. 
Before a principal is allowed to access the resources in a 
realm, its identity must be verified.  
Existing cross-realm authentication mechanisms require 
either federated authentication by maintaining direct cross-
realm authentication relationships between any pair of secu-
rity realms (often costly or impractical) or additional creden-
tial conversion from one realm to another. In this paper we 
present a new solution for dynamically authenticating the 
services from different realms for SOA-based business pro-
cesses at runtime. The main contributions of our work are: 
(1) using the multi-party session concept to structure dynam-
ic business processes, (2) a simple but effective way to es-
tablish on-the-fly trust relationships between the members of 
a business session, and (3) a set of protocols for multi-party 
session management, supported by formal analysis and em-
———————————————— 
J. Xu is with School of Computing, University of Leeds, Leeds, West 
Yorkshire, LS2 9JT, UK. E-mail: j.xu@leeds.ac.uk 
D. Zhang is with Beijing Research Centre of Huawei Technology, 
Shangdi, Beijing, 100085, China. E-mail: zhang_dacheng@hotmail.com 
L. Liu is with School of Computing and Mathematics, University of Der-
by, Derby, Derbyshire, DE22 1GB, UK. E-mail: l.liu@derby.ac.uk 
X. Li is with Faculty of Computer Science, Beihang University, Haidian, 
Beijing, China. E-mail:lixx@buaa.edu.cn 
 
Manuscript received Oct 20, 2009. This work was supported in part by 
the UK EPSRC/BAE Systems NECTISE project (EP/D505461/1), the ESRC 
MoSeS project (RES-149-25-0034), the EPSRC WRG project (EP/F057644/1), 
the EPSRC CoLaB project (EP/D077249/1) and the Major Program of the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.90818028). 
W
2 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICE COMPUTING,  VOL 4, NO. X, XXXXXXX 2011 
 
pirical evaluation. The correctness of these protocols is for-
mally verified using the well-known BAN logic for authen-
tication [6, 7]. We have also designed and implemented an 
authentication system that employs the multi-party session 
protocols and allows service instances working inside a 
business session to authenticate each other based on a varie-
ty of credentials available, e.g. shared session keys and ses-
sion memberships. This system has been incorporated into 
the CROWN-C Grid middleware [8]. Empirical evaluation 
has been performed to assess the system’s scalability and 
runtime overheads.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
discuss the fundamentals of constructing multi-party service 
interactions. Section 3 describes our proposed authentication 
protocols with formal proofs. In Section 4 we present an 
empirical evaluation using GT4 and CROWN middleware 
systems [9]. Section 5 discusses the related work while Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Authentication across Heterogeneous Se-
curity Realms 
Dynamic collaboration amongst different organisations is 
becoming increasingly common. Because principals could 
join or leave a collaborative business process in a highly 
dynamic and frequent fashion, it cannot be expected that a 
direct cross-realm authentication relationship always exists 
between each pair of the collaborating security realms. We 
consider two potential solutions in this section: federated 
authentication and credential conversion. These methods are 
then analyzed and compared with our proposed solution. 
2.1 Federated Authentication 
Federated authentication [10-13] offers a method for im-
plementing a direct authentication relationship between dif-
ferent organizations and business partners. Examples include 
SAML [10], OpenID [11], Liberty [12], and Windows 
Cardspace [13]. However, maintaining a direct authentica-
tion relationship between any pair of the security realms 
involved is costly and often difficult to implement in prac-
tice. Federated authentication requires specific infrastructure 
support, and it also involves costly contract amendments and 
time-consuming activities for establishing mutual under-
standings between partners. Moreover, when a server needs 
to authenticate a chain of credentials submitted by a client, 
the server has to perform multiple, expensive digital signa-
ture verifications [14]. These are main reasons for the slow 
adoption of existing mechanisms for federated authentica-
tion. 
2.2 Authentication-path of Credential Conversion 
Another solution to this problem would be to locate some 
intermediate realms that serve as an authentication-path of 
credential conversion between the two separate realms that 
are to collaborate. However, the overhead of generating an 
authentication-path for two distributed realms is not trivial, 
which requires the cooperation from intermediate security 
realms. The process may involve a large number of extra 
operations for credential conversion as well as a long chain 
of invocations to intermediate services.  
Moreover, such an authentication path of credential con-
version between two security realms may not even exist. 
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of a collaborative business pro-
cess where RA and RB are two security realms involved, and 
P1, …, Pn are principals involved. An authentication path 
could be created from P1 to Pn if RB chooses to recommend 
the principals introduced from RA to its federated security 
realms. However, RA may not trust RB enough, thereby de-
ciding not to recommend any principal from RB. When Pn 
attempts to contact P1, Pn wouldn’t be able to find a path for 
authentication. Without the existence of an authentication 
path, two realms to collaborate have to follow a more tradi-
tional and time-consuming method for building mutual trust, 
possibly with the support of contractual arrangements, mul-
ti-round negotiation, and human intervention. 
 
  
Fig. 1. A scenario of credential conversion between the 
two separate realms 
We believe what is needed is a “dynamic” scheme for 
multi-party authentication. Unlike traditional “static” au-
thentication protocols which assume pre-existing and fixed 
authentication relationships, a new scheme should be able to 
establish instantly at runtime an authentication relationship 
between any pair of principals that wish to collaborate. We 
will discuss and explain in the next section our solution for 
dynamic authentication based on the notion of multi-party 
business sessions. 
3. MULTI-PARTY BUSINESS SESSIONS 
In a distributed application, a session is a lasting collabo-
ration involving several participating principals, called ses-
sion partners. A session is often typified by a state which 
includes variables that hold information from messages 
transferred within the collaboration. A business process exe-
cution can be regarded conveniently as a business session. In 
terms of a Service-Oriented Architecture [15], a business 
session is a collaboration involving two or more collabora-
tive services, and has service instances as its session part-
ners (a service instance is here referred to as a stateful exe-
cution of a service.) In practice, a session may discover and 
select services at runtime. 
After receiving an initial request from a business session, 
a service normally spawns a service instance to handle the 
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request. Once this instance is accepted as a session partner, 
it is entitled to collaborate with other partners within that 
session. 
3.1 Two-Party Session 
As implied by the name, a two-party session consists of 
two session partners only, i.e. a client and a server. An au-
thentication process is required when the client sends an 
initial request to the server. A short-term secret key between 
the session partners is then agreed upon and generated. The 
secret key, also called session key, can be used in further 
communications to encrypt the messages transferred be-
tween the session partners [16].  
The two-party session technique is both simple and prac-
tically effective, and it is used widely in many distributed 
systems and integrated with the design of most authentica-
tion protocols (e.g. SSL and Kerberos [17]). However, new 
problems arise when the two-party session technique is ap-
plied directly to the construction of a multi-party session that 
has three or more session partners. Hada and Maruyama in 
[1] demonstrate that, if a multi-party session is constructed 
out of multiple two-party sessions, it is difficult in some 
cases for a session partner to verify whether the service in-
stance it contacts is actually a member of the same session. 
This is because the two-party session technique does not 
have a mechanism for distinguishing a principal from a 
group of other principals.  
In practice, the collaborating organizations involved in a 
business process execution often belong to different security 
realms. These realms may be heterogeneous, equipped with 
different security systems and mechanisms, and they are not 
necessarily interoperable. The two-party session technique 
does not address the issue with Heterogeneous Cross-Realm 
Authentication (HCRA), which typically requires credential 
conversion and the establishment of authentication paths. 
 
Fig. 2. A scenario of business process execution 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of a three-party business ses-
sion but constructed with two two-party sessions. The busi-
ness session consists of three participating services, Con-
sumer, Producer, and Shipper. At the start of the business 
session, an instance of Consumer, CI, contacts Producer to 
order some products. After receiving the request from CI, 
Producer creates a service instance PI to handle it. PI then 
selects Shipper to deliver the products to Consumer. An in-
stance of Shipper, SI, is thus generated to do this job, and it 
is required to negotiate with CI about delivery options and 
details. In this case, an HCRA process for authentication 
between SI and CI might have to be performed by means of 
a new two party session if SI and CI do not know each other 
and belong to different security realms. This HCRA process 
is both costly and complex. In some cases it is practically 
impossible to perform HCRA in an automatic and on-the-fly 
manner, and human intervention will be needed. For a busi-
ness session involved with n heterogeneous security realms, 
the HCRA process would have to be repeated n × (n – 1)/2 
times to allow all possible partner interactions with the ses-
sion. 
3.2 Multi-Party Session 
A multi-party session may have two or more session part-
ners for an intended collaboration. A partner can search for 
and invoke new services at runtime. Before a service (in-
stance) is accepted as a new partner, an HCRA process is 
normally needed. However, unlike a two-party session, au-
thentication for the existing partners of a multi-party session 
could be simplified significantly without requiring credential 
conversion and the establishment of any authentication path. 
This is because the session partners can make use of their 
shared session secrets and memberships to authenticate each 
other even if they belong to different security realms. A 
shared session key or individual secret keys may be used to 
enforce a secure collaboration amongst session partners. 
Consider the example of Fig. 2 again. When SI attempts 
to contact CI, it does not need to authenticate itself with the 
local authentication system of CI because both SI and CI are 
already members of the same session. SI can simply use its 
session membership and/or shared session secrets to prove 
its identity to CI. This simplified authentication process is 
called Simplified Cross-Realm Authentication (SCRA). 
While the HCRA process has to be repeated up to (n – 1) 
times (for the introduction of any new partners) for a multi-
party session with n security realms, up to (n – 1) × (n – 2)/2 
authentication processes between any existing partners can 
be simplified as SCRA, thereby reducing both cost and 
complexity significantly. 
There are different ways to start a multi-party business 
session, e.g. one or a group of services [18] may serve as a 
starter to initiate a session. Any existing session partner of 
the session may introduce new members into the session. If 
HCRA between the existing partner and the potential new 
member has been performed based on the established trust 
relationship between them, the authentication process for the 
session will be further simplified. In addition, there is some 
recent progress in developing protocols and mechanisms for 
HCRA based on automatic negotiation at runtime [24]. The 
work could be combined with SCRA to reduce further the 
cost and complexity of dynamic cross-realm authentication. 
It is important to notice that multi-party business sessions 
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are also a useful design abstraction for controlling and coor-
dinating multi-party interactions and collaborations. While it 
is convenient to use this abstraction to develop our proposed 
authentication system for automatic SOA-based business 
processes, our system could be combined with other models 
for multi-party interactions such as atomic actions [3] and 
process groups [16]. However, regardless of the model used, 
a multi-party authentication system needs to address the 
issues with message routing and secret keys for communica-
tions. A Session Authority (SA) is also required to provide 
reliable real-time information (e.g. memberships) about ses-
sion partners [1]. 
3.3 Message Routing 
Message routing is concerned with the issues of dispatch-
ing messages to the intended service instance which main-
tains corresponding states. In practice, a service may handle 
requests from different requestors concurrently. When all 
the requestors invoke operations provided by the same port, 
the messages are sent to the same address (e.g. the same 
URL). In this case, additional correlated information is 
needed, which helps the underlying middleware to deter-
mine which interaction a message is related to and to locate 
the corresponding service implementation object to handle 
the message. 
A simple approach is to exploit a correlated token, shared 
by the communicating partners, for identifying the related 
messages transported within the collaboration. A shared 
token is sufficient to the identification of session partners on 
the both sides of a two-party collaboration. However, ses-
sion partners (i.e. service instances) in a multi-party session 
may be generated by the same service with the same ad-
dress. It is difficult to distinguish them using a single token. 
In contrast with the token-based solution, an ID-based solu-
tion assigns every session partner with a unique identifier, 
thereby distinguishing all the partners unambiguously. In 
practice, a token-based solution is usually used to decide 
whether an instance is actually working within a business 
session while an ID-based scheme is employed to identify 
individual session partners in the case that fine-grained in-
stance identification is needed. 
3.4 Secret Keys 
In a two-party session, authentication typically consists of 
several rounds of operations and message passing, and the 
session key used in the subsequent communication between 
the two partners is normally a by-product of the authentica-
tion process. However, in a multi-party session, SCRA is a 
highly simplified process and does not include the automatic 
generation of secret keys. 
An obvious approach is to generate a single secret key for 
a given multi-party session and then distribute it to all the 
session partners. Once the session key is generated, it can be 
used to simplify the authentication process amongst the ex-
isting session partners, thereby avoiding HCRA. Hada and 
Maruyama’s protocols in [1] are an example of this type of 
solution with the support of a Session Authority. However, 
if a partner loses the secret key, the security of the whole 
session will be compromised. Moreover, session partners 
may leave and join a session dynamically. When a partner 
leaves from its session, the shared secret key must be re-
freshed with forward security techniques [19] in order to 
ensure that any previous partner cannot gain any further in-
formation from the session. 
Similarly, when a new partner joins the session, the secret 
key must also be refreshed in order to ensure that any new 
partner cannot obtain any previous information transferred 
within the session. The issues related with secret key revoca-
tion have been discussed in many papers on secure group 
communications (e.g. [20, 21]). 
Another possible solution is to generate a shared secret 
key for every pair of session partners (e.g. using the Diffie-
Hellman public key algorithm [22]). This scheme is more 
costly but it avoids the issue with key revocation. 
3.5 Session Authority 
A Session Authority (SA) is a service that provides relia-
ble real-time information (e.g. session memberships) for a 
given multi-party session. For example, the SA may be em-
ployed to notify that a partner has left from the session, by 
contacting all the partners that have collaborated with the 
previous partner. An SA service could be associated conven-
iently with, or implemented as part of, a multiparty man-
agement system. This can be implemented using different 
methods with different features and characteristics such as 
fault tolerance [23], scalability and cost-effectiveness. These 
methods include centralized management, decentralized 
architecture for better scalability, and fully distributed in-
formation provision for improved fault tolerance. As an ex-
ample of the SA implementation, our authentication proto-
cols are designed to conform to the WS-Coordination speci-
fication [24] in which an SA is an extension of a coordina-
tor. In WS-Coordination both centralized and decentralized 
coordinators are discussed. An SA may act as a centralized 
service that handles requests from all the session partners 
within a business session; alternatively, an SA may manage 
the session partners within a local domain only, and a group 
of decentralized SA’s can then manage collectively the 
whole business session, thereby avoiding the problem of 
concentrating the SA operations in a single place. 
3.6 Network Threats 
There are major security threats to SOA-based business 
processes that need to be addressed, including identity theft 
and replay attacks. Identity theft refers to a fraud that in-
volves someone pretending to be someone else for an illegal 
purpose. This type of security threat is in fact addressed by 
our proposed approach. In our authentication protocol, a 
session partner is required to generate its security key pair 
locally, and keep the private key in a secure place. Without 
having access to the correct private key, it is computationally 
difficult for an attacker to generate the required symmetric 
key using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm in order to imper-
sonate an honest session partner.  
A replay attack is an attack where an authentication ses-
sion is replayed by an attacker for granting access. In order 
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to address this type of threat, our protocol assigns a token to 
every message transported amongst session partners and 
session authorities. The token consists of a constantly in-
creasing sequence number, the session ID, and the identifiers 
of the sender and the recipient. If a message is resent to the 
original recipient, the attack will be detected by the recipient 
based on the sequence number. If the message is resent to 
other partners in the session, the message will be rejected by 
the partners as the recipient information of the message is 
incorrect. Moreover, if the message is sent to a different ses-
sion, the attack will be detected easily as the session ID is 
different and incorrect. 
4. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
In this section we will provide a multi-party authentica-
tion system and use the business scenario in Section 2 to 
explain the structure of the system. The related protocols are 
described and analyzed formally. The formal analysis ena-
bles us 1) to re-examine assumptions used to develop our 
authentication protocols, 2) to verify whether the objectives 
of our protocols are achieved through the intended actions, 
and 3) to analyze whether the cryptographic methods used 
are able to prevent impersonation and replay attacks. 
4.1 Example 
Consider an SA-based multi-party authentication system. 
In this system each business session is associated with a 
unique session identifier. Every service instance within a 
session is associated with a unique instance identifier so that 
every session partner can be identified unambiguously. The 
Diffie-Hellman public key algorithm is used to generate a 
pair of public/private keys for each service instance. The 
public key of an instance is bound with the “real-world” 
identity (e.g. company name) and can be transferred over the 
network while its private key is kept securely and can be 
used to prove the possession of the identifier. The Diffie-
Hellman algorithm is also exploited for generating a shared 
secret key for every pair of collaborating partners of a ses-
sion. 
Fig. 3 illustrates how the authentication system performs 
multi-party session authentication and management using 
the example of Fig. 2. First, CI contacts an SA to start a new 
business session, S. The SA service then generates an in-
stance, SA, to manage the new session. CI thus becomes a 
session partner of S, and its identifier is recorded in SA. CI 
then contacts Producer. Producer sends back the identifier 
of the instance PI in Step (2) while PI is introduced by CI to 
SA in Step (3). Next, CI starts to collaborate with PI after 
receiving the confirmation from SA (Step (4)). In the same 
way, PI invokes a new shipper instance SI and introduces it 
to SA (Steps (5) to (7)). After receiving the request from SI, 
CI first contacts SA to check whether SI is a legal business 
session partner of S (Steps (8) and (9)). Once this is con-
firmed by SA, CI and SI can use the Diffie-Hellman algo-
rithm to agree upon a shared secret key for further commu-
nications. 
 
Fig. 3. A business scenario 
4.2 Formal Definitions 
In this section we will define two core protocols in our 
multi-party authentication system using the well known 
Logic of Authentication (or BAN logic) [6, 7]. Protocol 1 is 
concerned with the introduction of a new session partner, 
and Protocol 2 performs authentication between two existing 
session partners. Notice that all messages of the protocols 
are enveloped in the XML documents and transported by the 
WS-protocols (e.g. SOAP). It implies that types of the mes-
sages are tagged. We therefore denote abstractly the mes-
sages as different types of symbols [25]. For the brevity of 
discussion, we use the following notation for formal defini-
tions and proofs (which is a simplified version of the nota-
tion used in  [6]). 
 
P large prime number 
A exponentiation base 
A, B, C session partners 
SA session authority  
IDA identifier of A 
S multi-party session with identifier IDS 
Pri(A) private key of principal A 
Pub(A) public key of principal A, i.e. (aPri(A) mod p) 
= IDA 
X, Y range over statements 
(M, N) composite message composed of messages 
M and N 
K(A, B) secret key generated with Pri(A) and 
Pub(B); K(A, B) = (Pub(B))Pri(A) = aPri(A) Pri(B) mod 
p; K(A, B) =K(B, A) 
MAC(M)K message authentication code of M generat-
ed with secret key K  
Secure(M)  message M is transmitted by a secure chan-
nel 
Valid(M)K composite message (M, MAC(M)K) 
↑Pub(A) Pub(A) is good [6], i.e. its corresponding 
Pri(A) will never be discovered by any oth-
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er principals and Pub(A) is not weak (e.g. 
Pub(A)=1) 
#M  M is fresh, i.e. M has not been sent in a mes-
sage at any time before the current run of 
the protocol 
SP(A, S) statement that A is a session partner of S. 
Particularly, SP(SA, S) is always true 
A  →←
−
),( BAK
B K(A,B) is A’s secret key to be shared with B. 
No third principal aside from A and B can 
deduce K(A, B), but A has not yet get confir-
mation from B that B knows K(A, B) 
A  →←
+
),( BAK
B K(A,B) is a key held by A. No third principal 
aside from A and B can deduce K(A, B). And 
A has received key confirmation from B 
which indicates that B actually knows K(A, B) 
A|≡X A believes that statement X is true 
A ⇒| X A is an authority on X, i.e. A has jurisdiction 
over X 
A<M  A receives message M from somebody 
 
Fig. 4 illustrates Protocol 1: Accepting a new session 
partner. Our protocol conforms to the WSResource Frame-
work (WSRF) specification [26], where a service is associ-
ated with a factory service F that generates service instanc-
es. 
 
Fig. 4. Protocol 1: Accepting a new session partner 
The details of the messages transported within Fig. 4 are 
presented as follows, where “A → B” means that A sends a 
message to B:  
(1) A→F: Secure(Request, IDS, IDA) 
(2) F→A:  Secure(IDB, IDS) 
(3) A→SA: Valid(SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, IDS, N)K(A, SA) 
(4) SA→A: Valid(Confirm, N+1) K(SA, A) 
(5) A→B: Valid(Invoke, IDA, IDB, IDS, N1)K(A, B) 
(6) B→A: Valid(Reply, IDB, IDA, IDS, N1+1)K(B, A) 
where N and N1 are fresh nonces. 
It is assumed that an HCRA process has been performed 
before Service 1 contacts Service 2. In Fig. 4 instance A is a 
session partner of S, and has registered with SA. When A 
tries to contact Service 2, it first sends a request (message 
(1)) to the factory service F of Service 2. F then generates a 
new instance B and sends the related information about B 
(message (2)) back to A. Next, A introduces B to SA (mes-
sage (3)). After receiving the confirmation from SA (mes-
sage (4)), A will start to communicate with B (messages (5) 
and (6)). During this process, the integrity of messages (1) 
and (2) needs to be protected by additional security channels 
(e.g. SSL, the secure conversation protocol, the secure mes-
sage protocol etc.) as B is not yet a session partner during 
those steps. The integrity of messages (3), (4), (5), (6) is 
protected by shared secret keys distributed within S. For 
example, A can use its private key and the identifier of B to 
generate K(A,B) according to the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 
K(A,B) is then used to generate the message authentication 
code of message (5). Similarly, B can use its private key and 
the identifier of A to generate K(B,A), which is identical to 
K(A,B). K(B,A) is then used to generate the MAC of mes-
sage (6). 
Fig. 5 illustrates Protocol 2: Authenticating a session 
partner. B and C are session partners of S, but B has not yet 
communicated with C before. First, B sends a request mes-
sage (1) to C. C then sends message (2) to SA in order to 
check the identity of B. SA will send back a confirmation in 
message (3), confirming that B is a session partner of S. Af-
ter receiving the confirmation, B will handle the request 
from C and send the result back. All the messages trans-
ferred during this process are encrypted by the secret key 
generated with the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. The details of 
the messages passed in Fig. 5 are presented as follows: 
(1) B→C: Valid(Request, IDB, IDC, IDS, N′ )K(B,C) 
(2) C→SA: Valid(Query, IDB, IDC, IDSA, IDS, N″ )K(C,SA) 
(3) SA→C: Valid(SP(B, S), IDSA, IDC, IDS, N″+1)K(SA,C) 
(4) C→B: Valid(Response, IDC, IDB, IDS, N′+1)K(C,B) 
where N′ and N″ are fresh nonces. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Protocol 2: Authenticating a session partner 
In Protocols 1 and 2, MACs are used to protect the integ-
rity of the messages transported within a business session, 
and fresh nonces are used to guarantee that a message is not 
replayed. 
4.3 Correctness Proofs 
In this section we use the extended BAN logic [6, 7] to 
analyze formally the correctness of Protocols 1 and 2. We 
first introduce some deduction rules to be used by our cor-
rectness proofs. These rules are specified in [6, 7]. 
Rules: 
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Rule 1: A |≡ (X, Y) ⇒ A |≡ X and A |≡ Y  
A believes a set of statements if and only if A believes every 
individual statement respectively. 
Rule 2: A|≡#M ⇒ A|≡#(M, N) and A|≡#(N, M)  
The whole message is believed to be fresh if a part of a mes-
sage is believed to be fresh. 
Rule 3: A|≡B ⇒| X, A|≡ B |≡ X⇒A|≡X  
This inference rule states that if A believes that B has a con-
trol over statement X, and if A believes that B believes X, 
then A should believe X. 
Rule 4: A|≡↑Pub(A), A|≡↑Pub(B)⇒ A|≡ BA BAK  →← − ),(  
This rule is derived from R31 in [6]. In this rule, if A has B’s 
public key and believes that the public keys of A and B are 
both good, A can believe that the secret is shared with no 
party other than B although unconfirmed.  
Rule 5: A|≡ BA BAK  →← − ),( , A <  Valid(X)K(A,B), A|≡#X ⇒ 
A|≡ BA BAK  →← + ),(  This rule derived from R32 in [6].  
Rule 6: A<  Valid(X)K(A,B), ( , )| A BKA A B+≡ ←→ , and A|≡#X ⇒ 
A|≡B |≡X 
Lemma 1  A < Valid(M)K(A,B), ( , )| A BKA A B+≡ ←→ , and 
A|≡#M, then A|≡B |≡M. 
Proof: This lemma can be deduced directly from Rule 6. 
4.3.1 Protocol 1: Accepting a New Session Partner 
Security goals of the protocol of accepting a new session 
partner include 1) accepting B as a new partner and 2) build-
ing a confirmed secret key to be shared between A and B. As 
illustrated in Fig. 4, this protocol conforms to the WS-
Resource Framework (WSRF) specification [26], where a 
service is associated with a factory service F that generates 
service instances. The security goals are formally described 
as follows: 
SA|≡ SP(B,S), ( , )| A BKA A B+≡ ←→ , and ( , )| B AKB B A+≡ ←→  
Additionally, the assumptions of this protocol are formal-
ly described as follows: 
SA|≡↑Pub(SA), A|≡↑Pub(A), B|≡↑Pub(B), SA|≡↑Pub(A), 
A|≡↑Pub(SA), A|≡↑Pub(B), B|≡↑Pub(A), SA|≡#N, A|≡#N1, 
B|≡#N1, SA|≡A ⇒| SP(B, S) 
It is the responsibility of SA to decide whether to accept 
an instance (e.g. B) as a session partner following certain 
policies. This assumption is in fact based on the simplest 
policy, that is, SA will accept any instance recommended by 
an existing session partner (e.g. A) as a new session partner. 
Other policies may include, for example, that only a particu-
lar set of session partners have privileges to introduce new 
session partners to SA; a new session partner can be accept-
ed only when a majority of session partners vote to accept it.  
To prove the correctness of the protocol, it is necessary to 
show whether its security goals can be satisfied after running 
the protocol under the stated assumptions. Therefore the 
following theorem is proposed. 
Theorem 1 The goals of the protocol of accepting a new 
session are satisfied under the assumptions of 
the protocol. 
Proof: It is needed to deduce SA|≡SP(B,S), 
( , )| A BKA A B+≡ ←→ , and ( , )| B AKB B A+≡ ←→  from the assump-
tions of the protocol.  
The third step of this protocol implies that SA<  Val-
id(SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, IDS, N)K(A, SA). We obtain 
SA|≡#(SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, IDS, N) by the assumption 
SA|≡#N and Rule 2. From SA|≡↑Pub(SA) and SA|≡↑Pub(A), 
it follows that SA|≡ SAA SAAK  →← − ),(  by Rule 4. Then, from 
SA|≡ SAA SAAK  →← − ),( , SA<  Valid(SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, 
IDS, N)K(A, SA), and SA|≡#( SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, IDS, N), it 
yields that SA|≡ SAA SAAK  →← + ),(  by Rule 5. Furthermore, we 
can deduce that SA|≡A |≡ (SP(B,S), IDB, IDA, IDSA, IDS, N) 
and SA|≡ A |≡SP(B,S) by Lemma 1 and Rule 1. Therefore, 
from the assumption SA|≡A ⇒| SP(B, S) and Rule 3, it fol-
lows that SA|≡SP(B,S). 
From B|≡↑Pub(B) and B|≡↑Pub(A), we have 
B|≡ ( , )B AKB A−←→  by Rule 4. Besides, from the sixth step of 
the protocol and the assumption B|≡#N1, it follows that B<  
Valid(Invoke, IDA, IDB, IDS, N1)K(A, B) and B|≡#( Invoke, IDA, 
IDB, IDS, N1). Consequently, we obtain ( , )| B AKB B A+≡ ←→  by 
Rule 5. 
From A|≡↑Pub(A) and A|≡↑Pub(B), we have 
A|≡ ( , )A BKA B−←→  by Rule 4. Besides, from the sixth step of 
the protocol and the assumption A|≡#N1, it follows that A<  
Valid(Reply, IDB, IDA, IDS, N1+1)K(B, A) and A|≡#( Reply, 
IDB, IDA, IDS, N1+1). Consequently, we obtain 
( , )| A BKA A B+≡ ←→  by Lemma 2. ( , )| B AKB B A+≡ ←→  can also 
be deduced through a similar procedure. Hence the theorem. 
4.3.2 Protocol 2: Authenticating a Session Partner 
The security goals of the protocol of authenticating a ses-
sion partner are 1) verifying whether a principal is a session 
partner, and 2) building a confirmed secret key to be shared 
between the session partners. Formal expression of the secu-
rity goals are presented as follows: 
C|≡ SP(B, S), ( , )| B CKB B C+≡ ←→ , and ( , )| B CKC C B+≡ ←→ . 
The formal descriptions of the assumptions are: 
C|≡↑Pub(C), SA|≡↑Pub(SA), B|≡↑Pub(B), C|≡↑Pub(SA), 
B|≡↑Pub(C), SA|≡↑Pub(C), C|≡↑Pub(B), B|≡#N′, C|≡#N′, 
C|≡#N″, and C|≡SA ⇒| SP(B, S) 
The correctness of this protocol is stated in the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 2  The goals of the protocol of authenticating a 
session partner are satisfied under the above as-
sumptions. 
Proof: By Rule 4, C|≡↑Pub(C) and C|≡↑Pub(SA) imply 
that C|≡ SAC SACK  →← − ),( . We obtain C<  Valid(SP(B, S), 
IDSA, IDC, IDS, N″+1 )K(SA,C) in the third step of the protocol, 
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and C|≡#( SP(B, S), IDSA, IDC, IDS, N″+1) by the assumption 
C|≡#N″ and Rule 2. It follows that C|≡ SAC SACK  →← + ),(  by 
Lemma 2. By Lemma 1 we obtain that C|≡SA |≡ (SP(B, S), 
IDSA, IDC, IDS, N″+1), and thus C|≡SA |≡ SP(B, S) by Rule 1. 
Since C|≡SA ⇒| SP(B, S), we have C|≡SP(B, S) by Rule 3. 
From the assumption C|≡↑Pub(C) and C|≡↑Pub(B), it fol-
lows that ( , )| C BKC C B−≡ ←→  by Rule 4. Since C <  Val-
id(Request, IDB, IDC, IDS, N′ )K(B,C) and C|≡#( Request, IDB, 
IDC, IDS, N′ ) which is derived from C|≡#N′ by Rule 2, then 
( , )| C BKC C B+≡ ←→  by Rule 5. ( , )| B CKB B C−≡ ←→  can be de-
duced from B|≡↑Pub(C) by a similar approach. Hence the 
theorem. 
4.3.3 Two Trivial Cases 
For the completeness of our description and discussion, 
we outline in this section two simple protocols for a partner 
to leave from a session and for ending a session. As a two-
party session has only two partners, a two-party session will 
end automatically when a partner leaves from the session. A 
business session with more than two partners may continue 
to operate after a partner has left, as long as the keys used by 
that partner are revoked properly. 
In practice, an SA can generate a public key pair and dis-
tribute the public key to all the existing session partners. 
Whenever a partner is to leave from the session, the SA can 
generate a SessionPartnerLeaving message and sign 
the message with its private key. The message and the signa-
ture are then sent to all the session partners that used to 
communicate with the leaving partner. All the shared keys 
between them can be therefore reinvoked. This solution is 
particularly efficient when the leaving partner has a large 
number of contacts within the session. 
A multi-party session could terminate in two circumstanc-
es. The session ends when all the partners have left. It is also 
possible that there are still session partners operating in the 
session but the session has to end for some reasons, e.g. in 
the occurrence of exceptions. The exception should be sig-
nalled to the SA. The SA will then send a 
SessionEnding message to all the partners still in action 
and dispose the associated SA instance.  
5. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
Beside analytic assessments, the feasibility of the pro-
posed authentication system in real-world applications also 
needs to be examined. Consequently, a series of experiments 
has been conducted using two production-quality Grid mid-
dleware systems in order to assess: 
1) scalability of our multi-party authentication system, 
2) compatibility of the system with other common mes-
sage-level security protocols, and 
3) runtime overheads of the mechanism under different 
conditions. 
Two experimental systems have been developed. The first 
experimental system (ES1 for short) consists of an SA ser-
vice and three experimental services. As illustrated in Fig. 6, 
a client in ES1 first initiates a business session, and then 
three experimental services repeatedly invoke each other 
until a particular amount of service instances have been gen-
erated and accepted into the business session. The second 
experimental system (ES2 for short) only consists of three 
experimental services. In the experiments, the experimental 
services of ES2 invoke each other repeatedly until a particu-
lar amount of service instances has been generated. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Experimental system with SA 
ES1 is used to simulate distributed applications that use 
the multi-party authentication system whilst ES2 simulates 
distributed applications without the multiparty authentica-
tion system. The experimental results of ES2 are used as 
benchmarks. By comparing the experimental results ob-
tained from both experimental systems, we can assess the 
overheads imposed by our authentication system. 
Our experimental systems are implemented on a Grid ser-
vice middleware system in which a Web service is associat-
ed with a factory service which is in charge of the generation 
and the management of resources. In the Grid, Web services 
are stateless, and state information is stored in resources. A 
service instance can be thus located when the corresponding 
resource is found. In ES1, the identifier of an instance and its 
associated private key are stored within a resource, and the 
instance identifier is identical to the resource identifier. 
5.1 Worst Case Assessment  
We have deployed the experimental systems both on a 
single computer and on a distributed system with multiple 
computers. Particularly, we deploy the experimental systems 
on a single computer for two reasons. 
• In order to evaluate precisely the overhead introduced 
by the authentication protocols (e.g. generating key 
pairs, generating MACs for messages etc.), we need to 
remove the influence introduced by the time consump-
tion of transporting messages. 
• Deploying the experimental systems on a single com-
puter can help us to evaluate the performance of the 
systems in the strictest environment where all the opera-
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tions are executed sequentially. In this sub-section all 
the experiments are deployed on a single computer un-
less stated otherwise. 
In this experiment, more than 24,000 instances are gener-
ated and introduced to the session authority. The experiment 
results indicate that the time consumed in accepting new 
service instances into a session is proportional to the number 
of the newly accepted instances shown in Fig. 7, until over 
16,000 instances are accepted. The performance decreases 
afterwards, and the system finally stops due to a lack of 
memory space.  
ES1 on a single computer (no additional security prtocol)
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Fig. 7. ES1 deployed on GT4 
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Fig. 8. ES1 and ES2 integrated with Secure Conversa-
tion on GT4 
In addition, ES1 and ES2 have been combined with two 
message-level security protocols, Secure Conversation and 
Secure Message, provided by GT4. In the experiment, the 
secure conversation protocol is used to generate signatures 
for the messages transported in ES1. As illustrated in Fig. 8, 
the time consumption of the experimental system starts to 
increase non-linearly after over 720 instances are accepted. 
The same phenomenon occurs in ES2 after over 1040 in-
stances are accepted when ES2 is integrated with the secure 
conversation protocol.  
As illustrated in Figs 8 and 9, the time consumption of 
ES1 is about twice that of ES2 although ES1 provides suffi-
cient support for session authentication operations. These 
experimental results indicate that the scalability of the au-
thentication mechanism varies, when integrated with differ-
ent message-level security protocols.  
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Fig. 9. ES1 and ES2 integrated with Secure Message 
on GT4 
Fig. 10 shows the overhead imposed by different security 
mechanisms. From the results, we can see that the proposed 
multi-party authentication mechanism spends more time on 
key generation and distribution than the single key mecha-
nism. However, the overhead introduced by the authentica-
tion mechanism is still comparable to the standard security 
mechanisms used in GT4. 
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Fig. 10. Overhead imposed by security mechanisms 
In order to avoid generating GT4-oriented results only, 
this design is also implemented in the large-scale CROWN 
(China Research and Development environment Over Wide-
area Network) Grid [9]. CROWN is a practical Grid system, 
aiming to promote the utilisation of valuable resources and 
cooperation of researchers nationwide and world-wide. As 
illustrated in Fig. 11, the experimental results show that time 
consumption of ES1 is about twice that of ES2. This is very 
similar to what have been observed in the GT4-based exper-
iments. However, as the computer used by CROWN is much 
more powerful, the performance of the experimental systems 
is much better. The experimental systems can stay in a stable 
state until over 260,000 instances are accepted. 
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Fig. 11. ES1 and ES2 on CROWN 
5.2 Distributed Deployment 
In order to evaluate the scalability of the system in a more 
realistic and distributed environment, the experimental sys-
tems were deployed on a distributed computer system. The 
performance of the experimental systems is improved signif-
icantly when deployed in a distributed environment with 
multiple computers. In the GT4-based experiments (Fig. 12), 
the time consumption of ES1 without combining other secu-
rity protocols increases linearly until more than 70,000 new 
instances are accepted.  
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Fig. 12. ES1 deployed on GT4 
Fig. 13 shows the proportions of time consumed by dif-
ferent operations in the experiment. In generating 900 in-
stances, about 38% of the time is spent on key generation, 
about 25% of the time is used by the additional operations 
introduced by the multi-party authentication protocol, and 
about 37% of the time is spent on the essential operations of 
service invocations, e.g. instance generation and message 
transfer.  
 
 
Fig. 13. Time consumption proportions 
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Fig. 14. ES1 integrated with secure conversation proto-
col on GT4 
When combined with the secure conversation protocol 
(Fig. 14), ES1 executes stably until over 3,000 instances are 
accepted. As an example of the distributed deployment, the 
experimental results based on CROWN are presented in Fig. 
15. The time consumption of ES1 is proportional to the 
number of newly accepted instances until over 300,000 in-
stances are accepted. 
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Fig. 15. Distributed ES1 and ES2 on CROWN 
According to the experimental results, we discovered that 
memory space is a critical factor that affects the perfor-
mance of the experimental systems. Information about ses-
sion partners needs to be recorded by the SA, and the re-
sources of experimental services also need to be stored in 
memory. When an experimental system is deployed in a 
distributed environment, the SA and the experimental ser-
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vices do not need to utilize the same limited memory. The 
performance of experimental systems therefore becomes 
much better. As presented in Fig. 16, the performance of the 
experimental system suddenly worsens near the end of the 
experiment deployed on GT4. This is because the operating 
system detects a lack of physical memory and attempts to 
move data from physical memory to swap space.  
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Fig. 16. Performance of ES1 on GT4 
Another factor is the size of log files. During experiments, 
the experimental systems record state information in log 
files. When the size of log file increases, experimental sys-
tems need to take a large amount of memory and time on 
reading and writing the log files. Due to the behavior of the 
Java garbage collection mechanism, the consumed memory 
is sometimes not released in a timely manner, and the per-
formance of the experimental system is thus affected.  
6. RELATED WORK 
The issues with cross-realm authentication have been dis-
cussed in many papers. For example, both direct cross-realm 
authentication and transitive cross-realm authentication are 
supported in Kerberos [17]. By using transitive cross-realm 
authentication, a principal can access the resources in a re-
mote realm by traversing multiple intermediate realms, if 
there is no cross-realm key shared with the remote realm. 
However, Kerberos assumes that the authentication mecha-
nisms in all the federated security realms are homogeneous. 
In practice, the authentication mechanisms in different secu-
rity realms are often heterogeneous and even non-
interoperable, both in structures and functions. In order to 
address the issue of federating heterogeneous authentication 
mechanisms, credential conversion mechanisms are widely 
used in many existing solutions. The work in [27] presents 
two types of credential translator services, KCA which trans-
lates Kerberos credentials to PK credentials, and KCT which 
translates PK credentials to Kerberos credentials.  
Another example is PGP/X.509 [28]. In PGP, by identify-
ing a chain of intermediaries, the receiver of a message can 
authenticate the sender even if they did not know each other. 
In [29], Jokl et al. discuss the authentication issues crossing 
different Grid security realms where independent CAs are 
applied. The solution proposed in the paper adopts bridge 
CAs to connect the CAs in different security realms so that a 
certificate can be validated through a path which may cross 
multiple security realms. Reiter and Stubblebine in [30] ar-
gue that an authentication process in a large-scale distributed 
system often needs the assistance of a path of security au-
thorities as it is difficult to locate a single authority to au-
thenticate all the principals in the system. They suggest us-
ing multiple paths to increase assurance on authentication. It 
is important to notice here that a Session Authority or SA in 
our system differs significantly from the security authority 
in [30]. A security authority is used to enforce security poli-
cies and processes for a security realm so as to prevent at-
tacks from accessing the applications and resources within 
that realm. In contrast, an SA is associated with a business 
session (management system), independent of any local se-
curity realm. It has much simpler functionalities than a secu-
rity authority, aiming to provide secure real information to 
session partners which may belong to different security 
realms.  
The problems related to federation amongst heterogene-
ous authentication mechanisms used by different security 
realms are also discussed in the Web Service federation pro-
tocol [31, 32]. The Web Service federation protocol defines 
a set of credential conversion mechanisms, with which a 
principal in a realm can convert its credential to a credential 
that can be accepted in another realm within the federation. 
It is shown that an authentication path can be found in poly-
nomial time if there is a centralised entity which holds all 
the federation information of the security realms possibly 
involved. Considering that the session partners of a business 
session may be determined dynamically at runtime, it is 
practically difficult to have sufficient information about the 
security realms to be involved before the execution of that 
session. However, without such a centralised entity, this job 
becomes much more difficult. In the extreme case, all the 
realms possibly involved need to be searched before an au-
thentication path can be identified.  
In order to realize peer-to-peer collaborations amongst 
Web Services, IBM, Microsoft, and BEA have proposed a 
specification: WS-Coordination [24]. WS-Coordination de-
scribes an extensible framework for supporting the coordina-
tion of the actions in distributed applications. However, WS-
Coordination is intended only as a meta-specification gov-
erning the specifications of concrete forms of coordination. 
The security issues discussed in this paper are not addressed. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In a Web Service context, a dynamic business process 
may involve many applications and services from different 
organisations and security realms, which are combined at 
runtime and collaborate in a peer-to-peer way. The dynamic 
authentication process between organisations could be 
highly complex and time-consuming since intermediate au-
thentication paths need to be created at runtime to dynami-
cally covert credentials from different security realms. If 
there is no existing authentication relationship in place be-
tween two organisations, it will be practically difficult for a 
system to enable any secure collaboration between services 
from the two organisations in a just-in-time fashion. 
In response to this challenge, we have developed a new 
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authentication system for multi-party service interactions 
that does not require credential conversion and establish-
ment of authentication paths between collaborative session 
partners. The system also offers the ability to identify indi-
vidual service instances within a business session even if 
some instances in fact belong to the same service. Although 
the amount of communications between the partners of a 
session and the Session Authority is limited, the perform-
ance overhead imposed by it is indeed of some practical 
concern. We have therefore conducted a set of comprehen-
sive experiments to assess the overhead on two service-
oriented Grid systems. The experimental results were col-
lected in a realistic and distributed setting which can ac-
commodate concurrently more than 300K service instances. 
The main results show that the overhead imposed by our 
authentication system is comparable with the overheads 
caused by the standard security mechanisms used in those 
Grid middleware systems. An interesting future question is 
how heterogeneous security realms agree upon the usage of 
secret keys within a session [33]. We are developing a nego-
tiation protocol to address this issue [34]. 
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